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Abstract 
The genesis of a priori review of legislation traces back to France, 
which was devised with a clear objective to ensure institutional balance and 
separation of powers between government branches. This model has spread all 
across Europe, including Georgia. The present paper, by applying analytical 
research methodology, aims to dwell on some of the institutional 
characteristics of constitutional system in Georgia and underscore potential 
difficulties of a priori review model that could be associated with its 
functioning in practice.  
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Introduction 
 The concept of constitutional review generally implies putting 
constraints upon political powers of s state. While this idea of judicial 
intervention in the process of political decision-making is a common 
characteristic of constitutional review bodies worldwide, different systems are 
differentiated. In respect of their temporal functioning, a priori and a posteriori 
review models1 are identified. The former entails the idea of judicial control 
before an impugned legal act is promulgated to take effect, thereby eliminating 
potentially unconstitutional provisions from national legislation. 
 The present paper aims to focus on a priori constitutionality review 
model in Georgia in order to investigate its systemic attributes as well as to 
trace potential difficulties of its operation both from institutional and practical 
perspective. The paper will resort to qualitative research methodology to 
provide analytical assessment of respective regulatory provisions and 
                                                          
1 The two systems are sometimes referred differently in literature, as a priori and a posteriori 
review, also ex ante and ex post review, or as preventive and repressive review. For the 
purposes of the present paper, the concepts of a priori and a posteriori review will be applied 
as a main point of reference.     
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constitutional jurisprudence in Georgia.  For this reason, the paper will briefly 
present the origins of a priori review model in France to refer to systemic 
features that are common to a priori check of constitutionality. Subsequently, 
the paper will focus on judicial control of international agreements to provide 
the most widespread feature of a priori review, after which the Georgian 
system will be analysed in order to identify potential deficiencies of a priori 
constitutionality review.        
 
A Priori Constitutional Review: Theoretical Rationales and Institutional 
Features 
 Despite a priori review of legislation is not commonly accepted form 
of constitutional justice, it has existed for a long time. Notably, it does not 
belong to traditional models of judicial review – American diffuse model does 
not recognise any form of abstract review, whereas Kelsenian centralised 
system implies the creation of a tribunal, distanced from legislature and able 
to function independently of the political process and act as a neutral arbiter 
between government branches (Comella, 2004: 161-163). A priori control of 
legislation is inherently the form of abstract constitutional review and serves 
the purpose of ensuring institutional balance between the executive and 
legislature, yet seems difficult in this case to remain substantially detached 
from the political process (Study on individual access to constitutional justice, 
2010: 14). 
 A priori constitutional review was originally conceived in France, 
where it has existed as a sole form of judicial review for almost five decades. 
In order to understand the essence of a priori review, it is important to analyse 
political and social aspects of French history. In particular, because of past 
experience, parliamentary sovereignty in France was understood as a direct 
expression of people’s power, thereby, any form of judicial control over the 
acts of parliament was perceived as irreconcilable with the principle of 
parliamentary democracy. Historical background and philosophical rationales 
behind the French constitutional system helps to explain mistrust of the 
judiciary, which was further amplified with respect to constitutional review as 
it was viewed a threat against the separation of powers (Aucoin, 1992: 448-
449). The decision by constitutional draftsmen in 1958 to establish the 
Constitutional Council2 with limited powers of judicial review was thereby a 
logical move. The Council was entitled to review constitutionality of 
parliamentary laws within limited timeframe before their promulgation. 
Notably, under the French system, a priori constitutional review may be 
instigated by the following political actors: the President, Prime Minister, 
Speakers of both houses of Parliament, and subsequent to 1974 amendments, 
                                                          
2 Original in French: ‘Conseil Constitutionnel’. 
European Scientific Journal November 2018 edition Vol.14, No.32 ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print) e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
20 
at least 60 deputies of both parliamentary chambers. The latter change has 
provided a valuable mechanism for minority MPs in parliament and 
respectively increased the caseload of the Council (Neuman, 2012: 261). It also 
follows that the introduction of this mechanism helped to reinforce the mission 
of a priori review model to ensure the institutional balance between the 
executive and legislature (Goldoni, 2012: 211-213). Notably, as a result of the 
2008 constitutional reform, France adopted traditional a posteriori review 
model as well, combined with individual complaint mechanism.  
 Since France is a birthplace for a priori constitutionality control model, 
it is proper to delve into the French system to grasp its institutional features. 
There is an opinion in literature, which is based on empirical study of 
constitutional jurisprudence that the Constitutional Council in France seems to 
be closer to the political process of lawmaking than to the judiciary (Sadurski, 
1999: 103-104). Even more so, it has been characterised as a ‘third chamber’ 
of the legislature (Stone, 1992: 209-210). Namely, the Council is empowered 
to declare unconstitutional parliamentary acts in abstracto without traditional 
adversarial proceedings. It has been suggested that the Council mainly 
considers political issues and offers the Parliament its own method to achieve 
their political objective. Thus, the Council is said to adopt positive decisions, 
which are instigated by referrals from political actors, which seek to interpret 
somewhat ambiguous constitutional provisions (Stone, 1999: 241). The 
Council is therefore identified as a political institution, rather than an 
independent tribunal administering justice. This view is further reinforced by 
the appointment procedure of members of the Council, whereby the President 
of the republic, as well as the speakers of both houses of Parliament, to 
unilaterally choose members of the Council for 9 years. Similar to other 
jurisdictions, it is considered problematic in France that legislation does not 
provide for qualification criteria for candidates, not for a public hearing 
procedure (Brouard and Honnige, 2017: 537). 
 Apart from being intertwined with the political process, there are a 
number of advantages for a priori review model. Namely, stability and clarity 
of the legal system are argued to be ensured when a normative act been subject 
to preliminary constitutionality check because the likelihood of its future 
invalidation is relatively low (van der Schyff, 2010: 107-108). Certainly, a law 
can still be subject to a posteriori review and declared unconstitutional if its 
meaning has changed over time, although the chance of its unconstitutionality 
is not high (Brouard and Honnige, 2017: 540). Further, it is said that a priori 
check of draft legislation by an independent tribunal is likely to facilitate 
transparency of lawmaking process because it would openly provide outside 
expert assessment (Sadurski, 1999: 105). 
 As regards its negative features, its major criticisms concern the key 
question of constitutional legal doctrine. Namely, a priori check of legislative 
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acts does not ensure that a law in question will not be subject to future 
constitutional scrutiny because of a different meaning it may have acquired 
(Comella, 2004: 472). Moreover, the Constitutional Court is likely to be less 
inclined to declare unconstitutional those legal norms it has positively assessed 
before. In order to preserve its authority, the court may be forced to exercise 
greater caution when conducting a posteriori review of formerly checked 
legislation. 
 It is noteworthy that the preliminary check of international treaties 
before their ratification is the most common form of a priori review model and 
exists in many constitutional systems (Safta, 2015: 2-3). The main problem 
identified in this context is the efficiency of the system. Namely, prevention of 
conflict between a given international treaty and constitution becomes 
dependent on the ability of the constitutional court to foresee the future 
(Neuman, 2015: 278). It would be problematic if the meaning of either 
international provisions or constitutional norms were to change. In contrast 
with reviewing national legislation, the constitutional court can do less to 
influence the future interpretation of an international treaty. It is less doubtful 
that if international treaty provision(s) is declared unconstitutional a posteriori, 
it will put the state in a difficult legal quandary. Under the 1969 Vienna 
Convention, the general principle of international law is provided, which states 
that a state cannot invoke their domestic legislation in order to justify non-
observation of international obligations. Therefore, when exercising the 
preliminary check of international treaties, the constitutional court ought to be 
careful and consider every potential implication.       
 Overall, it could be said that a priori review is a model of 
constitutionality control that allows political actors to refer disputes to a court 
in the course of lawmaking and, subsequently, accept its conclusion (van der 
Schyff, 2010: 108). It is thereby an instrument in the hands of political 
institutions to prevent unconstitutional legislating.    
 
A Priori Constitutional Review in Georgia: Analysis of Legislation and 
Jurisprudence 
 Georgia’s experience of constitutional jurisprudence is modest in spite 
of its rich historical and legal tradition. It has been almost 23 years since the 
current Georgian Constitution was adopted, the time which is barely enough 
for the reinforcement of inherent constitutional values. It is noteworthy, 
however, that the constitutional case-law has seen significant development, 
which plays a substantial role in the process of consolidation of a democratic 
state, conceived with the principles of rule of law. 
 Similar to many European countries, Georgia adopts the centralised 
model of constitutional review, exercised by the Constitutional Court (Article 
83.1, Constitution). It conducts the abstract review of legislation and is also 
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entitled to consider the constitutionality of normative acts in individual cases 
with respect to constitutional rights. As regards the a priori review, the Court 
is empowered, on the basis of respective referral, to decide on the 
constitutionality of international agreements subject to the ratification 
procedure (Article 38.2, Organic Law).           
 
1. A Priori Review of International Agreements: Potential 
Challenges for its Proper Functioning   
 Georgian legislation entitles the Court to pass on constitutionality of 
international treaties both a priori and a posteriori (Article 38, Organic Law). 
The law is specific to stipulate that a constitutional submission to the Court has 
to be made before the moment of ratification of a given international agreement 
or a part thereof. The need to ratify a treaty by a legislative body may be 
prescribed therein, yet there are certain categories of international agreements 
that must obtain parliamentary consent in order to become effective for 
Georgia. The Constitution requires ratification of treaties, whereby the subject 
matter is of military nature, or an admission of Georgia in international 
organisation is envisaged, or concerns territorial integrity of the state or 
modification of the state border, or foresees borrowing or lending of resources 
by the state, or requires changes into domestic legislation to implement 
international obligations (Article 65.2, Constitution).   
 Notably, the procedure of a priori review of international treaties is not 
adversarial in nature, because the respondent does not exist in the proceedings 
and the Court ought to elaborate on the presented arguments on its own. The 
case may be referred to the Court only by a specialised subject, namely, at least 
1/5 of MPs are empowered to make a constitutional submission requesting 
constitutionality check of an international treaty or part thereof subject to 
ratification. It follows that if the Court finds the contested treaty provisions 
unconstitutional, the Parliament is legally barred from proceeding with its 
ratification. 
 The Court has not so far been able to decide on the constitutionality of 
an international agreement before its formal approval by Parliament. Yet, 
under the Georgian legislation, similar to the most European countries, abstract 
a priori review of legislation is adopted, which only empowers a group of MPs 
to question the ratification procedure of an international treaty before the 
independent specialised tribunal. Other systems alike, as indicated above, the 
Constitutional Court of Georgia may also encounter practical challenges when 
exercising a priori review of international treaties. 
 Generally, it is hardly possible to imagine that exhaustive interpretation 
of legal norms, determining the scope of their future operation is practically 
feasible in any given jurisdiction. In the Georgian context, the Court is called 
to comprehensively analyse the contested international agreement and assess 
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its compatibility with national constitutional standards. It is positive, however, 
that the Court is not strictly limited time-wise to decide on such disputes, as 
legislation does not provide for any limitation. At the same time, the 
Parliament is constitutionally precluded to go on with ratification before the 
constitutional dispute is decided. This gives the Court possibility to conduct a 
deep and comprehensive examination of the treaty provisions in question. 
 Moreover, the Constitutional Court may potentially find itself in two 
different situations while adjudging on international treaties. Namely, 
depending on a subject matter, the Court may be requested to evaluate the 
constitutionality of an international agreement that has been in force for a long 
time and its provisions evolved to acquire different meaning beyond its textual 
substance. In such case, the Court has to choose which interpretative method(s) 
have to be employed in the present case. 
 The Constitutional Court of Georgia has well-settled practice of 
statutory interpretation, which implies not only consideration of the textual 
substance of a legal provision, but also taking into account the meaning 
(interpretation) that it has been given in practice (by administrative authorities 
or ordinary courts). It seems logical to assume that by reading an international 
treaty in its original meaning is likely to be implausible for the purposes of 
constitutional justice because it could cause the Court to make an incorrect 
evaluation and render a priori review ineffective. In another scenario, the 
evolutive interpretation of a treaty may become problematic with respect to the 
principle of legal certainty. In particular, it is likely to be very difficult for the 
Constitutional Court to determine actual substance (meaning) of international 
norms when they have been subject to dynamic and continuous interpretation 
by respective international bodies. Interpretation of international legal norms 
by a national tribunal is, in all likelihood, to be always challenged. Certainly, 
the Constitutional Court, depending on its institutional mandate, is not 
essentially required to possess highly expert knowledge of international law so 
that to convincingly decide on the interpretation of international legal 
provisions. Accordingly, the question, of which interpretative technique is to 
be pursued by the Court in these cases, is difficult to answer, that makes the 
constitutional procedure ever more complicated in this regard. 
 In the second instance, the Court may be called to consider the 
constitutionality of an international treaty that either has not formally entered 
into force, or has been in force for so short period of time that there is no 
practice about the contested provisions. There are seems to be two logical 
interpretative methods that need to be applied in such a case by the Court 
cumulatively: a textual reading of the provisions in question combined with 
analysis of travaux préparatoires, which could help the Court understand the 
original intent of draftsmen. Yet, it could hardly lighten its load, because, as 
indicated above, the future transformation of legal norms, the evolution of their 
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scope is so difficult to foresee that it is not going to be resolved by any 
interpretative technique or combination thereof. Correspondingly, it is another 
reason why the Court ought to exercise caution in the course of a priori review 
of international treaties. 
 As it was pointed out in this paper, a priori review of legislation is 
inherently intertwined with the political process of lawmaking, which could 
precipitate influence on the constitutional adjudication by different actors. It is 
thereby very important for the constitutional court, in order to maintain 
institutional independence and preserve its authority, to substantially distance 
itself from the political process and concentrate on deliberating legal 
arguments in the framework of the basic law.                   
 
2. A Priori Review beyond International Treaties 
 Georgian laws on constitutional proceedings do not explicitly establish 
a priori review of domestic legislation. It is however interesting, whether the 
existing laws provide sufficient basis as to implicitly empower the Court to 
exercise a priori control of parliamentary acts. 
 To answer this question, it is proper to recall those major institutional 
features that characterise a priori constitutional review, which implies 
constitutionality check of parliamentary laws before they are officially 
promulgated and in force. Under Georgian legislation, the Constitutional 
Court, on the basis of an individual complaint, reviews constitutionality of 
normative acts, which has been defined by the Court to in its material sense 
and involves range of parameters to determine normative character of a given 
legal provision (N1/494 Decision, 28.12.2010; ‘Citizen of Georgia Vladimer 
Vakhania vs. Parliament’, II-10). Namely, a legal act has to be generally 
applicable, obligatory to uphold and characterised by some degree of 
abstraction and repetition. 
 It is essential to analyse these parameters in order to determine whether 
draft parliamentary laws, which have undergone all stages of procedural 
lawmaking yet not been promulgated, might be classified as normative acts. 
The said characteristics should be interpreted in light of the Rule of Law 
principle, which, inter alia, implies that a legal act has to be legitimate. It is 
for this reason that the Constitution sets out a procedure of lawmaking that is 
based on the principle of separation of powers and requires the approval of 
draft legislative acts by a neutral arbiter outside of Parliament. Namely, the 
President is empowered to sign and promulgate parliamentary laws. Clearly, 
the Parliament enjoys ultimate superiority to adopt and promulgate laws 
without presidential consent, although it is a deviation from ordinary 
legislative procedure. Nonetheless, it seems fair to say that in both cases when 
a draft parliamentary law is not formally promulgated, it ought not to be 
considered as a normative act, since it would lack legitimacy and thereby, fail 
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to be subject to a priori constitutionality check. In short, the existing regulatory 
model in Georgia does not provide for a possibility to challenge draft laws 
adopted by the Parliament, via individual complaint procedure, before the 
Constitutional Court. 
 However, another potential scenario has to be noted, whereby a 
parliamentary legal act is promulgated, yet it provides for a late date of entry 
into force. It would seem hard to imagine such a case outside of the scope of 
constitutionality review, but an important question is if this check would 
qualify as a priori review. It needs to be recalled that some of major 
characteristics of this review model are its abstract nature and a specialised 
group of political actors that are entitled to refer a case before a court. It is a 
way for a parliament to ‘rectify’ their mistake without instigating a new 
legislative procedure. The given instance is likely to fall outside of the scope 
of traditional understanding of a priori constitutional review. 
 Moreover, the mentioned scenario may potentially occur in the course 
of abstract constitutional review. In particular, it is interesting to know whether 
the President of Georgia may refer a draft legal act, which has been submitted 
by the Parliament for promulgation, to the Constitutional Court for a priori 
review. This issue was raised in Moldova when the Constitutional Court opted 
for systemic interpretation of the Constitution and laws to conclude that since 
the Court enjoys general powers to consider constitutionality of laws on the 
basis of an individual complaint, it is not barred by the Constitution from 
reviewing constitutionality of laws not duly promulgated (Decision CCM no. 
9 of 14 February 2014 for interpretation of Article 135 (1) a) of the Constitution 
of the Republic of Moldova). Notably, the Moldavian Constitution and 
legislation refer such parliamentary act as a ‘law’, which provided basis for the 
Court to display extraordinary judicial activism and open the door for 
constitutionality review of draft parliamentary acts. 
 By contrast, textual substance of Georgian legislation, as well as it 
structure, does not offer much prospect for constitutional jurisprudence to 
develop towards the same direction. This paper reviewed the theoretical 
framework of a priori review and pointed out to the risk of distortion of the 
separation of powers. Namely, if we accept the idea that institutionally 
independent judicial body participating in the political process of lawmaking, 
it is likely to result in the politicisation of constitutional justice, which could 
undermine the principle of judicial independence and thereby, damage the 
legitimacy of constitutional decision-making. Correspondingly, it seems 
reasonable to ask when considering the expansion of constitutionality review 
over draft legal acts, whether it is practically feasible for the Constitutional 
Court, which might find itself close to parliamentary politics, to maintain 
institutional autonomy and effectively discharge its constitutional mandate – 
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to uphold institutional balance and separation of powers between the 
government branches, and protect fundamental rights and freedoms. 
 
Conclusion 
 The objective of this paper was to explore institutional and practical 
aspects of a priori constitutionality review in Georgia. It started with a brief 
history of a priori review model in France in an effort to present main 
ideological rationales that formed the basis for its evolution. It is argued that 
the French model was conceived in order to protect the separation of powers 
between state organs, which is, inter alia, ensured by entitling a limited number 
of political actors with the power to initiate constitutional proceedings. The 
foregoing feature and its role in the law-making procedure makes 
constitutional body of a priori review closely interrelated to the political 
process. 
 As a particular example of a priori review, the preliminary control of 
international agreements is conducted before its ratification by the parliament. 
The proceedings before the constitutional court are somewhat distinct in this 
respect due to varying effects of its outcome on domestic an international law. 
It would appear that a priori review of international agreements, meaning that 
it has not become applicable, could be more favourable for the state, since a 
posteriori check might well put its international obligations at stake.          
 The subsequent part of this paper dealt particularly with the Georgian 
model of a priori review and reflected on its important institutional features in 
the light of traditional French system. The paper identified some of the 
shortcomings of a priori check in Georgia and provided their analysis vis-à-
vis fundamental constitutional principles. 
 Due to its inherent connection with the political process, the major 
challenge before the Constitutional Court appears how to maintain its 
institutional autonomy while discharging a priori review of legislation and 
ensure fully independent and neutral adjudication in line with the original 
Kelsenian understanding. It is worth noting that divergence between the French 
a priori review model and the traditional Austrian system is evident in the 
Georgian context, where the centralised body of constitutional supervision is 
established. In the same vein, it is also empowered with a priori check of 
legislation, which could cause politicisation of the Constitutional Court and 
thus undermine the essence of its original Kelsenian conception. Nonetheless, 
it is fair to note that it is for evolving jurisprudence to cope with existing 
practical difficulties and to ensure a priori review is conducted effectively and 
consistently.   
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